



Smart Contract Audit Report

DEXYNTH Smart Contract

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Numen Cyber Labs - Security Services



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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Numen Cyber Technology was engaged by DEXYNTH to review smart contract implementation. The assessment was conducted in accordance with our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues based upon customer requirement. The report provides detailed recommendations to resolve the issue and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement.

One Medium severities findings is related to owner authority, centralized risk. One Information severities findings is related to logical judgment. One Low severities findings is related to Computational problems.

The outcome of the assessment outlined in chapter 3 provides the system's owners a full description of the vulnerabilities identified, the associated risk rating for each vulnerability, and detailed recommendations that will resolve the underlying technical issue.

METHODOLOGY

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [10] which is the gold standard in risk assessment using the following risk models:

- Likelihood: represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild.
- Impact: measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack.
- Severity: determine the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: High, Medium and Low. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, Critical, High, Medium, Low shown in table 1.1.



Table 1.1: Overall Risk Severity

To evaluate the risk, we will be going through a list of items, and each would be labelled with a severity category. The audit was performed with a systematic approach guided by a comprehensive assessment list carefully designed to identify known and impactful security issues. If our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the contract can be considered safe regarding the assessed item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private test environment and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.2.

- **Basic Coding Bugs:** We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- **Code and business security testing:** We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- **Additional Recommendations:** We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.



| Category | Assessment Item |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Basic Coding Assessment | Apply Verification Control |
| | Authorization Access Control |
| | Forged Transfer Vulnerability |
| | Forged Transfer Notification |
| | Numeric Overflow |
| | Transaction Rollback Attack |
| | Transaction Block Stuffing Attack |
| | Soft fail Attack |
| | Hard fail Attack |
| | Abnormal Memo |
| | Abnormal Resource Consumption |
| | Secure Random Number |
| Advanced Source Code Scrutiny | Asset Security |
| | Cryptography Security |
| | Business Logic Review |
| | Source Code Functional Verification |
| | Account Authorization Control |
| | Sensitive Information Disclosure |



| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Circuit Breaker |
| | Blacklist Control |
| | System API Call Analysis |
| | Contract Deployment Consistency Check |
| Additional Recommendations | Semantic Consistency Checks |
| | Following Other Best Practices |

Table 1.2: The Full List of Assessment Items

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [14], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development.



2 FINDINGS OVERVIEW

2.1 PROJECT INFO AND CONTRACT ADDRESS

Project Name: DEXYNTH

Project URL: <https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths>

Audit Time: 2023/3.13 - 2023/3.20

Language: solidity




Commit Hash: f9780ec12e907d1d8036c21020fc964ca109b4ac

| Contract Name | Source Code Link |
|---------------------------|---|
| GFarmNft1.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmNft1.sol |
| GFarmNft2.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmNft2.sol |
| GFarmNft3.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmNft3.sol |
| GFarmNft4.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmNft4.sol |
| GFarmNft5.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmNft5.sol |
| GFarmTradingStorageV5.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GFarmTradingStorageV5.sol |
| GNSNftRewardsV6.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSNftRewardsV6.sol |
| GNSPairInfosV6_1.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSPairInfosV6_1.sol |
| GNSPairsStorageV6.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSPairsStorageV6.sol |
| GNSPoolV5.sol | https://github.com/Global- |



| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| | Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSPoolV5.sol |
| GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2.sol |
| GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2_Bypassed.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2_Bypassed.sol |
| GNSReferralsV6_2.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSReferralsV6_2.sol |
| GNSStakingV6_2.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSStakingV6_2.sol |
| GNSTradingV6_2.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSTradingV6_2.sol |
| GNSTradingVaultV5.sol | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/GNSTradingVaultV5.sol |
| V6.3 | https://github.com/Global-Repo/Synths/contracts/V6.3 |

2.2 SUMMARY

| Severity | Found | |
|---------------|-------|---|
| Critical | 0 | |
| High | 0 | |
| Medium | 1 |  |
| Low | 1 |  |
| Informational | 1 |  |



2.3 KEY FINDINGS

One Medium severities findings is related to owner authority, centralized risk. One Information severities findings is related to logical judgment. One Low severities findings is related to Computational problems.

| ID | Severity | Findings Title | Status | Confirm |
|---------|-------------|--------------------------|--------|-----------|
| NVE-001 | Medium | Gov has higher authority | Ignore | Confirmed |
| NVE-002 | Low | Computational problems | Ignore | Confirmed |
| NVE-003 | Information | logical judgment | Ignore | Confirmed |

Table 2.1: Key Audit Findings



3 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS

3.1 GOV HAS HIGHER AUTHORITY

ID: NVE-001

Location: GNSPoolV5.sol

Severity: Medium

Category: Authority Issues

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: Medium

Description:

The Gov address in the GNSPoolV5 contract has the highest permissions, and functions such as setToken, setLp, and setBoostsP. These can set key parameters in the contract, and malicious parameter settings can affect the normal use of the contract.

```
function setToken(TokenInterfaceV5 _token) external onlyGov{
    require(address(_token) != address(0), "ADDRESS_0");
    require(address(token) == address(0), "ALREADY_SET");
    token = _token;
    emit AddressUpdated("token", address(_token));
}

function setLp(LpInterfaceV5 _lp) external onlyGov{
    require(address(_lp) != address(0), "ADDRESS_0");
    require(address(lp) == address(0), "ALREADY_SET");
    lp = _lp;
    emit AddressUpdated("lp", address(_lp));
}

function addAllowedContract(address c) external onlyGov{
    require(c != address(0), "ADDRESS_0");
    require(token.hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, c), "NOT_MINTER");
    allowedContracts[c] = true;
    emit ContractAllowed(c, true);
}

function removeAllowedContract(address c) external onlyGov{
    require(c != address(0), "ADDRESS_0");
    allowedContracts[c] = false;
    emit ContractAllowed(c, false);
}

function setBoostsP(uint _bronze, uint _silver, uint _gold, uint _platinum, uint _diamond) external onlyGov{
    require(_bronze < _silver && _silver < _gold && _gold < _platinum && _platinum < _diamond && _bronze > 0, "W
    boostsP = [_bronze, _silver, _gold, _platinum, _diamond];
    emit BoostsUpdated(boostsP);
}
```

Figure 1 Some functions that only gov can call



Recommendations:

In addition to the GNSPoolV5 contract, GFarmTradeStorageV5, GNSNftRewardsV6, and GNSPairInfosV6_1 , GNSPairsStorageV6 , GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2 , GNSPriceAggregatorV6_2_Bypassed, GNSReferralsV6_2, GNSStakingV6_2, GNSTradingV6_2. The highest permissions for GNSTradingVaultV5 contract are also the "gov" address.

Numen Cyber Lab recommends properly manage the gov address, and multiple signature or time lock contracts can be introduced to serve as the gov role.

Result: Pass

Fix Result:

Ignore.

3.2 COMPUTATIONAL PROBLEMS

ID: NVE-002

Location: GNSPoolV5.sol

Severity: Low

Category: Computational problems

Likelihood: Low

Impact: Low

Description:

Users can pass in the referral address when staking and will also allocate a portion to the referral when calculating the reward. the referral address is 0, the user will receive 94% of the reward. the referral address is not 0, the user will receive 97%, and the referrer will receive 3%. When the referral address is not 0, the user stake will get 3% more rewards.



```
function harvest() public{
    if(lpBalance == 0){ return; }

    User storage u = users[msg.sender];

    uint pendingTokens = pendingRewardToken();

    if(pendingTokens > 0){
        if(u.referral == address(0)){
            token.mint(msg.sender, pendingTokens - pendingTokens * referralP / 100); //94
        }else{
            uint referralReward = pendingTokens * referralP / 200;

            token.mint(msg.sender, pendingTokens - referralReward); //97
            token.mint(u.referral, referralReward); //3

            users[u.referral].referralRewardsToken += referralReward;
        }
    }

    u.debtToken = (u.provided + u.totalBoost) * accTokensPerLp / 1e18;
}

// Stake LPs
function stake(uint amount, address referral) external{
    User storage u = users[msg.sender];

    // 1. Transfer the LPs to the contract
    lp.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);

    // 2. Harvest pending rewards
    harvest();

    // 3. Reset lp balance
    lpBalance -= (u.provided + u.totalBoost);

    // 4. Set user provided
    u.provided += amount;

    // 5. Set boosts and debt
    setBoosts();

    // 6. Update lp balance
    lpBalance += (u.provided + u.totalBoost);

    // 7. Set referral
    if(u.referral == address(0) && referral != address(0) && referral != msg.sender){
        u.referral = referral;
    }
}
```

Figure 2 function stake,function harvest

Result: Pass

Fix Result:

Ignore

3.3 LOGIC JUDGMENT



ID: NVE-003

Location: GNSPoolV5.sol

Severity: Information

Category: Logic Judgment

Likelihood: Information

Impact: Information

Description:

When calling `stakeNft`, there will be a structure record. The variable `u.stakedNftsCount` will record the user's mortgage quantity, starting from 0. `UnstakeNft` unlocks the pledge, requiring an `nftIndex` to be passed in to indicate the subscript. It should be added to determine whether the passed in `nftIndex` is less than `u.stakedNftsCount`. When calling `unstakeNft`, you need to judge `nftIndex < userNfts[msg.sender][u.stakedNftsCount]`.



```
function stakeNft(uint nftType, uint nftId) external notContract{
    User storage u = users[msg.sender];

    // 0. If didn't already stake NFT + nft type is either platinum or diamond
    require(u.stakedNftsCount < maxNftsStaked, "MAX_NFTS_ALREADY_STAKED");
    require(nftType >= 1 && nftType <= 5, "WRONG_NFT_TYPE");

    // 1. Transfer the NFT to the contract
    require(getnfts()[nftType-1].balanceOf(msg.sender) >= 1, "NOT_NFT_OWNER");
    getnfts()[nftType-1].transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), nftId);

    // 2. Harvest pending rewards
    harvest();

    // 3. Reset lp balance
    lpBalance -= (u.provided + u.totalBoost);

    // 4. Store NFT info
    StakedNft storage stakedNft = userNfts[msg.sender][u.stakedNftsCount];
    stakedNft.nftType = nftType;
    stakedNft.nftId = nftId;
    u.stakedNftsCount ++;

    // 5. Set user boosts & debt
    setBoosts();

    // 6. Update lp balance
    lpBalance += (u.provided + u.totalBoost);
}

// Unstake NFT
function unstakeNft(uint nftIndex) external{
    User storage u = users[msg.sender];
    StakedNft memory stakedNft = userNfts[msg.sender][nftIndex];

    // 1. Harvest pending rewards
    harvest();

    // 2. Reset lp balance
    lpBalance -= (u.provided + u.totalBoost);

    // 3. Remove NFT from storage => replace by last one and remove last one
    userNfts[msg.sender][nftIndex] = userNfts[msg.sender][u.stakedNftsCount-1];
    delete userNfts[msg.sender][u.stakedNftsCount-1];
    u.stakedNftsCount -= 1;
}
```

Figure 3 function stakeNft,function unstakeNft

Recommendations:

Numen Cyber Lab recommends determine whether the incoming nftindex is less than u.stakedNftsCount.

Result: Pass



Fix Result:

Ignore.



4 CONCLUSION

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed DEXYNTH smart contract implementation. The problems found are described and explained in detail in Section 3. The problems found in the audit have been brought up to the project party, ignored issues are in line with the project design, and permissions are only used for the project to properly function. We therefore deem the audit result to be a **PASS**. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.



5 APPENDIX

5.1 BASIC CODING ASSESSMENT

5.1.1 Apply Verification Control

- Description: The security of apply verification
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.2 Authorization Access Control

- Description: Permission checks for external integral functions
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.3 Forged Transfer Vulnerability

- Description: Assess whether there is a forged transfer notification vulnerability in the contract
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.4 Transaction Rollback Attack

- Description: Assess whether there is transaction rollback attack vulnerability in the contract.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.5 Transaction Block Stuffing Attack

- Description: Assess whether there is transaction blocking attack vulnerability.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.6 soft fail Attack Assessment

- Description: Assess whether there is soft fail attack vulnerability.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.7 hard fail Attack Assessment

- Description: Examine for hard fail attack vulnerability
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.8 Abnormal Memo Assessment



- Description: Assess whether there is abnormal memo vulnerability in the contract.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.9 Abnormal Resource Consumption

- Description: Examine whether abnormal resource consumption in contract processing.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.1.10 Random Number Security

- Description: Examine whether the code uses insecure random number.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Critical**

5.2 ADVANCED CODE SCRUTINY

5.2.1 Cryptography Security

- Description: Examine for weakness in cryptograph implementation.
- Results: Not Found
- Severity: **High**

5.2.2 Account Permission Control

- Description: Examine permission control issue in the contract
- Results: Not Found
- Severity: **Medium**

5.2.3 Malicious Code Behaviour

- Description: Examine whether sensitive behaviour present in the code
- Results: Not found
- Severity: **Medium**

5.2.4 Sensitive Information Disclosure



- Description: Examine whether sensitive information disclosure issue present in the code.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: **Medium**

5.2.5 System API

- Description: Examine whether system API application issue present in the code
- Results: Not found
- Severity: **Low**



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Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. Numen's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. Numen's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies, and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.



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